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Original Meaning Without Originalism
JAMES

E.

FLEMING*

I. INTRODUCTION

Is it possible for a constitutional theorist to give due regard to original
meaning in constitutional interpretation without being an originalist? Narrow
originalists, such as Robert H. Bork and Justice Antonin Scalia, have asserted
that it is not.' On their view, it is hypocritical for anyone who is not a narrow
originalist to make recourse to original meaning-a clear case of the devil
quoting scripture. Their view is bogus. Nevertheless, constitutional theorists
who are not narrow originalists have not paid sufficient attention to how
arguments based on original meaning function in constitutional law. One of the
many virtues of Michael C. Dorf's excellent article 2 is that it shows that one can
take original meaning seriously without being a narrow originalist. Doff argues
persuasively that the Supreme Court itself, when it makes arguments based on
original meaning, is not typically being originalist in the conventional, narrow
sense. This is a significant argument and an important contribution to constitutional theory.
Dorf's larger project, as he puts it, is to integrate normative and descriptive
constitutional theory. He posits two gaps between normative and descriptive
accounts of constitutional law. 4 Dorf's first gap poses a challenge for originalists: Constitutional theorists who accept an originalist normative account must
acknowledge that they cannot account descriptively for many nonoriginalist
constitutional law decisions. His second gap poses a challenge for nonoriginalists: theorists who accept a nonoriginalist normative account must acknowledge
that they cannot account descriptively for the significant role that arguments
based on original meaning play in constitutional law.
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University. Ph.D. 1988, Princeton University; J.D. 1985,
Harvard University; A.B. 1977, University of Missouri. I am grateful to Martin Flaherty, Abner Greene,
Linda McClain, Bill Treanor, and Ben Zipursky for helpful comments.
1. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 187-240

(1990) (arguing that constitutional theorists who are not narrow originalists advocate forms of revisionism that reject original meaning and substitute other methods of constitutional interpretation); ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 37-47 (1997) (same); Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862-64 (1989) (same). We should
distinguish narrow or conventional originalists such as Bork and Scalia, who conceive original meaning
at a relatively specific level of abstraction, from broad originalists like Bruce Ackerman and Lawrence
Lessig, who conceive original meaning at a considerably higher level of abstraction. See infra note 6
and accompanying text.
2. Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of
OriginalMeaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765. In this response, I use the term "original meaning" because that is
the term that Doff uses. I intend here to bracket, and not take a position on, questions concerning the difference
or relationship between original meaning, original understanding, original intention, and the like.
3. Id. at 1767.
4. Id.
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Doff accepts the .first gap as unbridgeable, and he does so without evident
regret. It would require a conservative counterrevolution beyond the wildest
apocalyptic dreams of Bork and Scalia to close that gap, and the moment of
closure would be fleeting for courts promptly would resume their practice of
drawing upon sources besides original meaning. Dorf's article is notable, and
laudable, for the extent to which it assumes that we inhabit, if you will, a
"postoriginalist" world. Because of this assumption, he rejects two other attempts to bridge the first gap. He provides insightful and incisive critiques of
broad originalism-which he calls "a kinder, gentler originalism" 5-of the sort
propounded by Bruce Ackerman and Lawrence Lessig. 6 He also advances
cogent critiques of the eclecticism proposed by Henry P. Monaghan, Philip
Bobbitt, and Richard F. Fallon.7
Doff takes up the challenge of bridging the second gap. He does so by
-attempting to integrate a nonoriginalist normative account of constitutional
decision-making with a descriptive account of how arguments based on original
meaning actually function in Supreme Court opinions. In his descriptive account, Doff introduces the evocative categories of ancestral originalism and
heroic originalism, and provides an instructive analysis of the role of post-enactment history in constitutional interpretation. 8 This descriptive account is quite
illuminating and helpful. I fear, however, that Doff does not succeed in integrating his descriptive account with a normative account, and thus fails to bridge
the second gap. In Part II, I contend that he does not develop a full normative
account, nor does he show how such an account entails or requires, or is
otherwise linked to, his descriptive account. Doff could narrow the second gap
by embracing a normative account like Ronald Dworkin's moral reading of the
Constitution, 9 Lawrence Sager's justice-seeking constitutionalism, ° or my own
5. Id. at 1774.
6. Id. at 1774-87 (criticizing 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); Lawrence
Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995); and
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation,71 TEx. L. REv. 1165 (1993)). Other scholars have sought to
develop similar forms of broad originalism. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch,
105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996); Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism,
95 COLUM. L. REv. 523 (1995); William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to
Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 1997); William Michael Treanor, The Original
Understandingof the Takings Clause and the PoliticalProcess, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782 (1995).
7. Doff, supra note 2, at 1768-69, 1787-96 (criticizing PHILIP BOBBrrr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE
(1982); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A ConstructivistCoherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation,100
HARV. L. REv. 1189 (1987); and Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988)).
8. Id. at 1800-16.
9. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
1-38, 72-83 (1996) (arguing for the moral reading of the Constitution: that the Constitution embodies
abstract moral principles-not particular historical conceptions-and that interpreting and applying
those principles requires fresh judgments of political theory about how they are best understood);
Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism,Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1249 (1997) (same).
10. See Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional
Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 410, 415-16 (1993) (arguing for a justice-seeking account of the Constitution:
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Constitution-perfecting theory of constitutional constructivism." Such normative accounts entail a commitment to construct the interpretation that best fits
and justifies the constitutional text, history, and structure, as well as practice,
tradition, and culture. In Part III, I suggest that Dorf's descriptive account
significantly contributes to our understanding of the quest for fit with such
constitutional materials. My critique is largely sympathetic and mostly architectural; that is, it focuses on how Dorf frames and structures certain issues and
arguments.
II. BRIDGING

THE GAP

BETWEEN DORF'S

NORMATIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE

ACCOUNTS
To succeed in bridging the second gap, Dorf would need to provide a full
normative account of constitutional interpretation, provide a full descriptive
account, and integrate the two by elaborating how the first entails or requires the
second.
Does Dorf provide a full normative account? He states that he rejects the
normative account of narrow originalism, and accepts the normative account of

nonoriginalism.1 2 But he does not fully develop a nonoriginalist normative
account or adopt any well-developed account of that sort. Instead, throughout

the article, the term "nonoriginalism" basically serves as a placeholder for a
normative account that is never developed. Moreover, the term "nonoriginalism" does not present Dorf's arguments in their best light. Dorf is vulnerable in
calling his normative account "nonoriginalism," because he plays into the
derogatory terms that the narrow originalists have used to stack the deck against

views like his own. 13 I believe that Dorf's own normative views have deep
affinities with the normative accounts of Dworkin, Sager, and myself 14 and that

that the abstract, liberty-bearing provisions of the Constitution cannot be given concrete meaning
without engaging the interpreter's judgments of political justice); Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible
Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 893, 893 (1990) (same); see also Lawrence Sager, The Betrayal of
Judgment, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1545, 1552 (1997) (same).
11. See James E. Fleming, Securing DeliberativeAutonomy, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1, 15 (1995) (arguing
for a Constitution-perfecting theory that reinforces not only the procedural liberties but also the
substantive liberties embodied in the Constitution); James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive
Constitution, 72 TEx. L. REv. 211, 214-18 (1993) [hereinafter Fleming, Constructing] (same). In this
response to Professor Doff's article, I draw upon, and further develop, arguments that I have made
previously. See James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1335
(1997) [hereinafter Fleming, Fidelity].
12. Doff, supra note 2, at 1767.
13. I reject the distinction between originalism and nonoriginalism, just as I reject the distinction
between interpretivism and noninterpretivism. See Fleming, Constructing,supra note 11, at 221 n.42;
Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469, 471-76 (1981) (rejecting these
distinctions).
14. The affinities between Dorf's normative views and Dworkin's normative account are evident
throughout his article. See, e.g., Doff, supra note 2, at 1772 & n.30, 1809 n.219; see also Michael C.
Doff, Truth, Justice, and the American Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 133 (1997) (reviewing RONALD
DWORKIN,FREEDoM's LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE CONsTTrUTION (1996)). In turn, there are deep

affinities between Dworkin's account and those of Sager and myself.
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any of these accounts would provide firmer normative ground for his project
than does nonoriginalism.
Does Dorf provide a full descriptive account? Again, here is where Dorf's
most significant contributions lie. His descriptive account considerably advances our understanding of how arguments based on original meaning actually
function in Supreme Court opinions. I shall assess this account more fully
below.
Finally, does Dorf integrate his normative account with his descriptive account? I do not believe that he makes an argument for why his "nonoriginalist"
normative account entails or requires his descriptive account or that he otherwise establishes a link between the two. He does not explain why persons
accepting a nonoriginalist normative account would care about, much less be
required to make recourse to, original meaning in the sense of ancestral
originalism and heroic originalism-nor does he explain why a nonoriginalist
would consider it appropriate to ponder the lessons of history contained in
post-enactment history.
What explains this curious disjuncture between Dorf's normative account and
his descriptive account, given that his stated aim is to integrate them? I have
two thoughts. First, what drives his descriptive account is not his normative
account but rather his aim to describe how arguments based on original meaning actually function in Supreme Court opinions. Thus, it should come as no
surprise that his descriptive account does not seem to follow from his normative
account. Second, having provided a rich descriptive account, Doff does not take
the next step of addressing what normative account would justify constitutional
interpretation that accords with that descriptive account. Instead, he simply
states that he accepts a nonoriginalist normative account.
How might a normative account be integrated with a descriptive account? For
example, what provides the link between the normative account and the descriptive account of well-developed constitutional theories, such as narrow originalism and Dworkin's moral reading? I believe that this link is provided by
conceptions of fidelity in constitutional interpretation. The question of fidelity
poses the questions "What is the Constitution?" and "How should it be
interpreted?"' 5 Corollaries of the first question would include: "Does the
Fourteenth Amendment embody abstract moral principles or enact relatively
concrete historical rules?" and "Does the Constitution presuppose a political
theory of majoritarian democracy or one of constitutional democracy?" With
respect to the second question, one might ask: "Does fidelity to the Fourteenth
Amendment require recourse to political theory to elaborate general moral
concepts, or does fidelity prohibit such recourse and instead require historical
research to discover relatively specific original understanding?" and "Does the
quest for fidelity in interpreting the Constitution exhort us to make it the best it
15. See Fleming, Fidelity, supra note 11, at 1335; see also Symposium: Fidelity in Constitutional
Theory, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1247 (1997).
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can be or forbid us from doing so in favor of enforcing an imperfect Constitution?" Both narrow originalism and Dworkin's moral reading answer these
questions with normative accounts that entail particular descriptive accounts.
Narrow originalists, such as Bork and Justice Scalia, have claimed a monopoly on concern for fidelity in constitutional interpretation, asserting that
fidelity requires following the rules laid down by, or giving effect to the
relatively specific original understanding of, the framers and ratifiers. 6 They
have charged that constitutional theorists who reject these claims are "revisionists" who disregard fidelity and thereby subvert the Constitution. 17 Dworkin has
vigorously and cogently punctured the narrow originalists' pretensions to a
monopoly on fidelity, turning the tables on them by arguing that commitment to
fidelity requires the pursuit of integrity with the moral reading of the Constitution and that they, the narrow originalists, are the real "revisionists." '18 Dorf
effectively criticizes narrow originalists' normative and descriptive accounts,
but he is silent concerning their claim to a monopoly on fidelity. Indeed, Dorf
remains curiously silent concerning the question of fidelity generally.
How does a conception of fidelity integrate Dworkin's normative account
with his descriptive account? His normative account entails a descriptive account that carries with it an obligation of fidelity-an obligation to search for
the best interpretation along two dimensions: fit and justification.' 9 Thus, the
commitment to fidelity is both a matter of fit with historical materials and a
matter of justification in political theory.
A conception of fidelity like Dworkin's would help bridge Dorf's second gap.
It would explain why normative accounts like Dworkin's moral reading, Sager's
justice-seeking constitutionalism, or my own constitutional constructivism-all
of which are similar to Dorf's normative views2°-entail a descriptive account
such as that elaborated by Doff. They do so because of the obligation that the
best interpretation must fit and justify the historical materials: the constitutional
text, history, and structure, as well as practice, tradition, and culture.
III.

RECONCEIVING

DORF'S DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT

One might view Dorf's descriptive account as an attempt to develop an
alternative to both narrow originalism of the sort advocated by Bork and Justice
Scalia and broad originalism of the type developed by Ackerman and Lessig.

16. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-27, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.);
BORK, supra note 1, at 143-60; Scalia, supra note 1, at 852-54.
17. BORK, supra note 1, at 187-240; SCALIA, supra note 1, at 37-47; Scalia, supra note 1, at 852-56,
862-64.
18. DWORKIN, supra note 9, at 74-76; RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT
ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 125-29 (1993); Dworkin, supra note 9, at 1250.
19. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 9, at 90. Doff generally accepts Dworkin's account of best

interpretation as having two dimensions: fit and justification. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 2, at 1772,
1809 n.219.
20. See supra text accompanying notes 9-11, 14.
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Elsewhere, I have argued that some liberal constitutional theorists resist constitutional theories like Dworkin's moral reading and attempt to develop a broad
originalism because they believe that Dworkin's theory does not take fit with
historical materials seriously enough-in other words, that it suffers from a
"problem of fit." ' 2 1 In response, I have distinguished Dworkin's theory of
fidelity as integrity with the moral reading from Dworkin's own application of
it, urging theorists to: "Do as Dworkin says, not as he does. '' 22 That is, I would
argue that Dworkin's theory of fidelity as integrity is the best conception of
fidelity, while conceding that Dworkin himself may not always satisfactorily do
the "fit work" called for by his own theory-or that he may do it too abstractly
to overcome criticism that he does not take fit as seriously as he should. I have
suggested that the appropriate response is not to reject Dworkin's theory, but to
undertake the fit work that it calls for.
Dorf's descriptive account richly elaborates certain ways of doing fit work,
and it nicely accords with the type of fit work called for by normative accounts
such as Dworkin's, Sager's, and my own. Dorf's categories of ancestral originalism and heroic originalism, along with post-enactment history, are species of an
aspirational and hortatory constitutionalism of the sort entailed by such normative accounts. Ancestral originalism, in part, underscores the notion that an
interpretation should fit with our practice, tradition, and culture. Heroic originalism, in part, shows that an interpretation should be in accord with our deepest
aspirations and the best in us as a people. We should conceive fidelity to the
Constitution in terms of honoring our aspirational principles rather than merely
following our historical practices and concrete original understanding, which no
doubt have fallen short of those principles. Dorf's categories of ancestral and
heroic originalism illustrate important types of fit work sanctioned by the best
available normative accounts.
Moreover, Dorf's descriptive account usefully shows that many arguments
based on original meaning operate at an intermediate level of abstraction.
Dworkin's theory meets with some resistance because of the high level of
abstraction in his own analyses of original meaning. By contrast, Scalia's theory
meets with some resistance because his own analyses of original meaning
(supposedly) are at a specific level of abstraction. What is needed are demonstrations of analyses of original meaning at intermediate levels of abstraction and
accounts of how they operate at such levels. Dorf's notions of ancestral and
heroic originalism are instructive in this regard. Constitutional interpreters make
recourse to ancestral and heroic originalism not because they are being narrow
originalists, but rather to demonstrate that their proffered interpretations fit with
our historical materials, including our practice, tradition, and culture. The
appeals to original meaning analyzed by Doff under the categories of ancestral
and heroic originalism are neither as specific as those advocated by Bork and

21. Fleming, Fidelity, supra note 11, at 1348-49.
22. Id. at 1349.
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Justice Scalia, nor as abstract as those of Dworkin. Instead, they sit at an
appropriate intermediate level of abstraction where much aspirational or hortatory constitutional argument actually functions in Supreme Court opinions.
My interpretation of Dorf's descriptive account also would more comfortably
accommodate Dorf's account of the role of post-enactment history in constitutional interpretation than does his idea that he is developing a "nonsocialcontractarian originalism."' 2 3 It seems odd to make appeals to post-enactment
history as part of an originalist program, however conceived. It is not at all
strange to make appeals to such history, however, if one views the purpose of
historical argument as being to show that a proffered interpretation fits with our
historical materials (which would include both pre-enactment and postenactment materials). After all, post-enactment historical materials are not part
of the original meaning to which fidelity is owed on the narrow originalist
account. But those materials may be part of our constitutional practice, tradition, and culture, which Doff, like Dworkin, believes conscientious constitutional interpreters have an obligation to fit and justify.
This brings me to a more general criticism. Above, I praised Dorf's analysis
of original meaning for being quite "postoriginalist." For that reason, I am
surprised and disappointed that he characterizes his descriptive account in terms
of developing a "nonsocial-contractarian originalism." Again, Doff is persuasive in arguing that "much of what passes for social-contractarian originalism
in Supreme Court opinions may be better understood as some combination of
ancestral and heroic originalism.", 24 Put another way, he correctly argues that
appeals to original meaning in Supreme Court opinions are not necessarily or
even usually originalist in the conventional, narrow sense. Nevertheless, I
would reject calling these appeals to original meaning forms of "originalism"even "nonsocial-contractarian originalism."
Elsewhere, I have argued that some liberal and progressive constitutional
theorists who have sought to develop broad forms of originalism, such as
25
Ackerman and Lessig, are in the grip of what I call the "originalist premise."
This is the assumption that originalism, rightly conceived, is the best (or indeed
the only) conception of fidelity in constitutional interpretation.26 Similarly,
Doff's characterization of appeals to original meaning as heroic originalism and
ancestral originalism, along with references to "nonsocial-contractarian originalism,''2 7 may unwittingly reinforce, or worse, reflect the originalist premise. (I
do not believe that Dorf's descriptive account reflects that premise, but I fear
that such formulations may reinforce it.) This is unfortunate and surprising
given Dorf's own persuasive critique of the broad originalists. One would not
expect him, unwittingly or otherwise, to evince that problematic premise. Nor
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Dorf, supra note 2, at 1770.
Id.
Fleming, Fidelity,supra note 11, at 1344.
Id.
Doff, supra note 2, at 1770.
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would one expect him to reflect the related problematic premise that all appeals
to original meaning are necessarily a form of originalism-narrow, broad, or
otherwise.
IV. CONCLUSION

I conclude with an exhortation prompted by Dorf's cogent descriptive account. Our constitutional culture is not as originalist as the narrow and broad
originalists seem to assume. 28 It certainly requires constitutional lawyers and
scholars to pay homage to history and to fit with historical materials, but that is
not to say that it is originalist. Originalism is an ism-a conservative ideology
that emerged in reaction to the Warren Court. Before Richard Nixon and Robert
Bork launched their attacks on the Warren Court, originalism as we now know it
did not exist. Constitutional interpretation in light of original understanding did
exist, but original understanding was regarded as merely one source of constitutional meaning among several-not as a general theory of constitutional interpretation, much less the exclusive legitimate theory. Moreover, original
understanding, especially at a relatively specific level, was understood to be
largely indeterminate and inconclusive. Regrettably, many constitutional lawyers and scholars in recent years seem to have lost sight of this great wisdom.
Dorf's project promises to recapture this wisdom and to provide an eminently
reasonable and sensible approach to arguments based on original meaning in a
"postoriginalist" world. It holds out the hope of developing a constitutional
theory that gives due regard to original meaning without being originalist.

28. Fleming, Fidelity, supra note 11, at 1347-48.

